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Introduction 
 
My aim in this paper is to explore whether narratives can be portrayed as informal  
arguments. The paper comprises a part of a larger investigation into the meaning, uses and 
misuses of narratives and narrative research in the social sciences. Narrative research is 
rapidly becoming a trend to be reckoned with in e.g. educational research. It is, however, 
highly controversial and much of the discussion is polarized into “for and against” camps. 
Both its prevalence and controversial character suggest that it is vital to identify both 
advantages and shortcomings of the narrative approach, such that its place, possibilities and 
limitations in social scientific research may be appraised.  
 Argumentation theory covers a huge field with a wide range of topics and 
perspectives. The same holds true for narrative theory. To bring the two together, or rather, to 
place the concept of narrative within argumentation theory and apply it to various topics, is a 
venture that requires great caution. I will now briefly delineate the concepts of argument and 
narrative; they will be further elaborated throughout the paper. According to Wesley Salmon 
(1984) an argument is a group of statements standing in relation to each other. Among the 
basic terms are conclusion, premise, (causal) inference and evidence. Argumentation, on the 
other hand, is a complex, interdisciplinary phenomenon – a social, intellectual, linguistic 
activity – that encompasses the use of arguments as one of its elements (van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst & Kruiger 1987). In this paper I shall focus on arguments, thus leaving out a 
number of elements found in the wider argumentation field that admittedly might have been 
pertinent to the present topic. Concerning arguments, different views emphasize different 
functions and different properties, and presumably the relation between premises and 
conclusions may also be construed in different ways. I mention this relation specifically 
because I believe that the nature of this relation is a core issue in deciding whether narratives 
can be construed as arguments or not. Whereas some theorists focus primarily on the status of 
the conclusion (e.g. Hempel 1965), others argue that it is the relation between premises and 
conclusion that should be the main focus (e.g. Biro & Siegel 1992, Salmon 1984). I shall 
return to this issue. Regarding narratives, there exists an enormous body of literature. Despite 
this, the notion remains fairly elusive. It seems that there exists no generally agreed-upon 
view of narratives, but rather a set of overlapping meanings from which advocates of narrative 
may choose the meanings that best suit their intentions. Narrative theory denotes an 
interdisciplinary field, where we find e.g. literary theory, culture theory, history, education 
and psychology. Within these domains, narratives are discussed as a way of making sense of 
life, a phenomenon, a method and a result (product) of this method (e.g. Carr 1991, Carter 
1993, Ricoeur 1984, Taylor 2000).  
This paper takes its point of departure in an article by Matthew Keefer (1996). His 
article is a critique of Deanna Kuhn’s study of informal argumentation (Kuhn 1991), which he 
claims is based on a theoretical, scientific model that only partly captures the nature of 
informal arguments. He uses narratives to exemplify what he terms practical and/or rhetorical 
arguments, which he proposes as an alternative model. I shall inquire into whether narratives 
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can do the job he wants them to do. Next, I shall discuss Keefer’s claim that the narrative 
itself is evidence for the belief in question. This is where the relation between premises and 
conclusion becomes very important. Some narrativists deny that they can be “detached” from 
each other and independently evaluated, and Keefer seems to embrace this view. But first, the 
“landscape” for the present analysis will be outlined.    
 
 
A Tentative Conceptual Landscape 
 
As already mentioned, the source of inspiration for this paper is Matthew Keefer’s 
critique of Deanna Kuhn’s book. To get as clear a picture as possible of the place of narratives 
in this debate, some introductory comments are necessary. 
In her book The skills of argument Deanna Kuhn describes and discusses the results of 
an empirical study of informal arguments, in the shape of people’s everyday, real-world 
thinking (Kuhn 1991). For Kuhn, the use of arguments is central to our thinking ability. Her 
research was designed to show the subjects’ abilities to weigh and evaluate evidence, to 
separate evidence from theory (view), to generate alternative theories or explanations, to 
envision conditions that would falsify their own theories etc. In her own judgment her results 
were not very encouraging; very roughly her conclusion is that many people perform poorly 
on her reasoning tasks. They tend to reason with rather than about their theories and thus do 
not or are not able to contemplate whether these theories are true, in contrast to simply 
knowing or believing them. On the other hand, she reports that people have a high degree of 
confidence concerning their own theories.   
As I understand Keefer, he thinks that Kuhn has committed some sort of category 
mistake. Her research design leads her to treat people’s general accounts as scientific 
hypotheses and as a result of this, legitimate forms of practical argument are inappropriately 
subsumed under a scientific model. Keefer disputes that people have “theories” (1996, 48).  
Kuhn’s subjects, he says, did not hold their views as theories, but as narratives. So they 
reason practically, whereas Kuhn treats their reasoning as theoretical and comes to consider 
practical arguments as failed theoretical justifications. Keefer concludes that one cannot 
investigate the practical solely in terms of the theoretical and then draw conclusions 
pertaining to the general nature of informal arguments.   
Now I do not wish to discuss the quality of people’s reasoning skills, nor do I wish to 
take sides in this debate. Rather, I wish to focus on the (possible) role of narratives, which 
means that the conceptual landscape indicated above must be somewhat elaborated if we are 
to see what is at stake here.  
To begin with, it should be noted that we have at least two distinctions that may or 
may not run parallel; namely formal – informal arguments and theoretical – practical 
arguments. In addition we may have a set of distinctions between formal and informal 
reasoning on the one hand and theoretical and practical reasoning on the other. Neither Kuhn 
nor Keefer distinguishes explicitly between arguments and reasoning, but rather uses the 
terms interchangeably. Keefer also employs the terms theoretical and practical knowledge. It 
is surely not clear that arguments and reasoning are the same kind of thing, but nor is it clear 
what might hinge on upholding an explicit distinction between them in the present context. I 
shall simply side step this particular difficulty.  
Let us first look at the distinction between informal and formal arguments. This 
distinction is vital to assessing the possibilities for portraying narratives as informal 
arguments. Again, neither Kuhn nor Keefer is very clear about this distinction or what it is 
designed to capture. Kuhn discusses both deductive and inductive reasoning, and seems to 
equate deduction with formal reasoning. Such reasoning, she says, is characterized by having 
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a well-structured problem and a well-defined correct answer (6-7). If this can be transferred to 
formal arguments, we can arguably say that she bases the distinction on form, such that 
arguments that conform to e.g. syllogistic structure, or perhaps are capable of being so 
rendered, are to count as formal arguments – not at all an uncommon view. If this is the case, 
then informal arguments may be negatively defined as those arguments that cannot so 
conform. In her conclusion, however, she seems to suggest that the distinction is content-
based, such that reasoning or thinking about real-world, complex issues that people meet in 
their everyday lives, is informal by definition. But surely one can reason both formally and 
informally about complex real-world issues, and at any rate Kuhn makes no attempt to say 
what it is about real-world issues that makes them susceptible to informal but not to formal 
arguments. In her conclusion (277) she also seems to suggest that “formal” applies to the 
ability to reason from information given. But this is part of her own research design, and she 
defines her own project as an empirical study of informal reasoning and arguments. I propose 
to settle, somewhat loosely, on a certain form as the defining characteristic of a formal 
argument; the precise properties both of elements and relations will, I guess, vary. For the 
time being, then, an informal argument is one that does not satisfy the form. 
Keefer devotes a substantial part of his article to the distinction between practical and 
theoretical knowledge (reasoning, arguments), and the gist of his argument hinges on this 
distinction. However, the distinction may not be as obvious or immediately understandable as 
Keefer presupposes. The term “theory” is used in a variety of ways, both in science and in 
common sense. Keefer seems to equate theoretical and scientific knowledge. Theoretical 
knowledge, he says, conforms with an independent external reality and addresses such 
questions as “’What is the underlying cause of this event?’ or, ‘Does A vary reliably with B in 
situations of type Y?’” (1996, 38). Practical knowledge, on the other hand, does not have its 
truth by conformity to reality, although this does not imply that practical knowledge is exempt 
from claims to truth. More importantly, perhaps, practical knowledge (reasoning) is not 
primarily concerned with what is, but with what one can or should do. Practical knowledge is 
the knowledge that is inherent in bringing something to fruition. Its reality is available by and 
through the agent’s actions in pursuit of a value or a project of some kind. Part of his criticism 
of Kuhn’s study is that an agent may manifest a certain partiality for the reasons that support 
his values or goals, and that this partiality should not be mistaken for a failure to assume a 
critical stance toward those reasons. 
The reasons that support practical decisions and actions are chosen; they are not 
established on the basis of evidence. Furthermore, and this is a vital point, “the valuation of 
our practical beliefs and the ‘evidence’ in support of them do not attain the degree of logical 
independence that obtains between scientific hypotheses and their evidential confirmation” 
(43). Drawing on Perelman, Keefer suggests that our informal knowledge is justified in a 
manner different from scientific knowledge; in fact, he suggests that justification arises as an 
issue in the practical realm only when there is substantive disagreement.  
The situation can now be described as follows: Kuhn thinks she has conducted a study 
of people’s informal, real-world, theoretical thinking, whereas Keefer thinks this informal, 
real-world thinking is of a practical nature. From Keefer’s point of view (although he does not 
say this), Kuhn may be suspected of having committed a double category mistake: taking 
practical arguments for theoretical and for scientific arguments – assuming that scientific 
arguments can be informal. Let us take a look at some examples from Kuhn’s book: 
 
(20Nms) Well, number one, what causes kids to fail in school I think has to do with 
not being motivated. (Anything else?) And it stems from the way they are brought up 
at home. I think the parents have a lot to do with it (30). 
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(TCms) (What could you say to show that this other person was wrong?) Well, I could 
show that there are students who are failing and they’re not in gangs and they have a 
fine home life, but they just don’t seem to try for some reason (153). 
 
(60Nfc) What evidence might this person give to try to show that you were wrong?) 
They might say that somebody came out of prison and did not want a job. They 
wanted to do it the easy way … get money fast. (Could someone prove that you were 
wrong?) Well, if they knew somebody in particular, they could say you are wrong 
because we wanted to give this person a job and he refused. Work is not for him (161). 
 
(TNfc) (How do you know that this is the cause?) Cause sometimes when the wife is 
… wants to marry him or something, she don’t expect him to do things – raping, 
robbing – because, you know, like if a family has money problems, you have to try to 
find a job, or do a part-time job to get the money. (Just to be sure I understand, can 
you explain exactly how this shows that this is the cause?) Well, when he gets out [of 
prison], he goes … he knows where he still lives and he knows that she is still living 
there, and he knocks on the door and she says “Who are you?” He’ll say, “Well, I’m 
your husband.” She will say, “Well, my husband wasn’t in prison.” And she’s gone 
and left him, and she’s going to say, “You’re not my husband; my husband wouldn’t 
do such a thing.” And she won’t want him. … (Is there anything further you could say 
to help show that what you’ve said is correct?) Well, my uncle, since he knows. … He 
went into prison. When he came out, his wife has two kids. And she didn’t want him 
anymore, because he was in prison. … (69).  
 
These quotes are but a taste of people’s reasonings as collected by Kuhn and are by no 
means intended to be a representative sample as far as argument quality – normatively 
speaking – is concerned. Kuhn (and her helpers) asked the subjects a lot of questions in order 
to tap into people’s use of evidence, their alternative theories, ability to generate 
counterarguments and rebuttals as well as their deeper epistemic attitudes and beliefs, e.g. 
concerning certainty. The main question for the present inquiry is whether we are dealing with 
theoretical or practical reasoning (arguments) here.   
On the face of it, even Keefer might concede that these quotes – at least the three first 
ones – look like examples of theoretical reasoning, given his own definition. People reason 
about causes, alternative causes, evidence for and against etc. A number of things need to be 
teased out here. To begin with, I think that Keefer attaches too much weight to Kuhn’s use of 
the word “theory.” Keefer seems to associate “theory” very closely with “science.” There is 
some textual evidence for this, among other things his rather frequent use of the or of 
inclusion, for example in “The kind of knowledge that Kuhn’s line of questioning tries to 
elicit from her subjects is theoretical or scientific knowledge” (38). But I do not think that this 
necessarily is how Kuhn uses “theory.” First, she is interested in people’s informal, real-world 
reasoning, not scientific reasoning. Second, the word “theory” has multiple uses, many (most) 
of them vague and imprecise, and it is frequently used outside of the sciences. It seems to me 
that Kuhn uses the word in an uncommitted, commonsensical way. She sometimes uses 
“explanation,” and could as well have used “belief” or “view.” At the same time, and here 
Keefer has a good point, one should make no mistake that her standards for assessing people’s 
reasoning are taken from scientific reasoning. One can arguably infer from this that she holds 
that commonsensical and scientific reasoning are continuous entities, with scientists and 
laymen fundamentally doing the same, namely make inferences, weigh evidence etc., but 
presumably with the scientists being more careful and conscious and having a bigger 
vocabulary and methodological arsenal at their disposal.    
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 It is not self-evident why Keefer thinks that reasonings such as the above are examples 
of practical rather than theoretical reasoning. Practical reasoning, he says, is concerned with 
what people can or should do, whereas Kuhn’s subjects are asked to reason about what is and 
how they know this. Keefer’s reason for construing their arguments as practical may be 
content-related, meaning that the subjects try to explain why someone (not themselves) 
chooses to act in a certain way. I shall leave this particular problem for the moment, and just 
observe that for the sake of the argument I will accept Keefer’s view. 
Keefer’s discussion of practical reasoning and arguments centres on the agent; the 
agent’s values, projects and experiences and actions in pursuing his values and bringing his 
projects to fruition. Reasons are offered as justifications for acting as we did, rather than as 
evidence for beliefs. It is not clear that Kuhn’s subjects reason like this, although some may 
approach it because they employ personal experiences in their deliberations. Perhaps one of 
Keefer’s concerns is that the subjects are forced into reasoning in ways they are not used to? 
In some sense I think that Kuhn’s line of questioning does force the subjects into articulating 
and otherwise dealing with their everyday theories (broadly understood) in unusual ways. We 
know from social psychology that as long as our social interactions run (relatively) smoothly 
and/or are satisfactorily facilitated, we do not have or perhaps do not even need a high degree 
of precision in our views, normatively correct inference strategies or procedures for weighing 
evidence (e.g. Nisbett & Ross 1980). We can get around well without worrying about the 
truth or evidentiary status of our beliefs. This is not to suggest that the truth and tenability of 
our beliefs never matter in our everyday lives. However that may be, this socio-pragmatic 
element is lost to Kuhn, who effectively ignores all social context and focuses instead on the 
“internal” quality of the arguments themselves.  
 
 
Can Narratives be Arguments? 
 
It is now time to bring narratives into the picture. Kuhn discusses narratives in terms 
of pseudo-evidence; to her they signify an amassing of detail that has no bearing on the truth 
of the theory in question. For Keefer, a narrative is an informal, practical, rhetorical argument. 
He has been inspired here both by Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, and claims that 
practical arguments are a kind of transition type argument that articulates how people came to 
hold the values they do. Such arguments, thus, fix on the nature of the transition from A to B, 
and can be used to articulate the meaning of an important value or pursuit. Then Keefer goes 
on to say that, “In practical or narrative type arguments the aim is to provide a context 
wherein that action or behavior may be understood as rationally willed or intelligibly chosen” 
(45). It is, however, not entirely clear that such a context amounts to a transition argument. 
A number of things need to be teased out and examined here. I shall begin by noting 
that I believe that narratives may be both “theoretical” and “practical,” there is nothing in the 
constitution of narratives that principally bars them from one or the other domain. But the 
concept, I have indicated, is elusive. Both MacIntyre (1996) and Taylor (2000) use narrative 
in their deliberations of the “large scheme of things,” such as self, life, modernity, morality. 
An exploration into the concept is now in order. 
The literature on narratives to a large extent focuses on elements or items to be found 
in a narrative in its explication of what narratives are. Thus, we are told, narratives consist of 
events, characters, actions, characters, goals and plots. These items are connected in some 
way; frequently it is required that they be organized in causal sequences (e.g. Gudmundsdottir 
1990). This causal sequence makes up a meaningful, coherent whole with a non-random 
beginning, a middle and a non-random end – that is, events and actions should follow from 
one another, not just after one another. This whole is created by an act of configuration, 
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performed by a narrator, which means the “grasping together” of all elements into a coherent 
whole (Ricoeur 1984). The same process is also covered by the term emplotment, also used by 
Ricoeur, since the plot is frequently seen as the point of the story. So far this account of 
narrative is compatible with both transition arguments and contexts, as outlined above. But 
the pseudo-evidence of Kuhn is not captured by this concept of narrative, despite the presence 
of both characters, actions and events in the more “flourishing” responses. The fourth 
example above is described by Kuhn as “narrative” in style. But a narrative is not just any 
story, how ever rich in details it may be. 
One crucially important fact about narratives that virtually all narrativists agree about 
is that the emplotment or configurational act takes place in hindsight. When a narrator sets out 
to configure a narrative, he does so with a certain knowledge of the result, the event etc which 
the narrative is to lead up to (end, conclusion, closure of plot); namely that it has happened. 
As Paul Ricoeur puts it, the narrator begins “… from the fact that something has happened, 
we infer, backward through time, that the antecedent necessary condition must have occurred 
and we look for its traces in the present, …” (1984,135). That is, narrators first reason 
backwards and then tell the story forwards again, by selecting the events and actions that they 
judge are important for the result. 
  At this point we run up against a highly controversial matter; the ontology of 
narratives. As I have outlined them above, narratives are products, configured in hindsight. 
This conception clearly ties in with Kuhn’s main focus, which is the meta-level where people 
think about their own thinking. This requires that one is able to have one’s own views as 
objects – it is a major point for Kuhn that people should be able to reason about, not just with, 
their theories. And one can reason about a narrative that is a product. Keefer’s position is 
more complicated and somewhat ambiguous, but he takes issue with Kuhn’s emphasis on 
having one’s views as objects. Keefer never defines narrative, nor does he say what “items” 
we generally find in narratives. He runs the risk, I believe, of confusing character and 
narrator. Characters are integral parts of the events, performers of actions related by the 
narratives; a narrator is the one who tells the story. The situation of the narrator, therefore, is 
one of superior knowledge compared with the characters. With hindsight, the narrator knows 
the whole story, knows the end/conclusion, can trace the connections and judge which actions 
led to which results etc. The character/narrator confusion that Keefer possibly is guilty of is 
connected to his reasons for defining the reasoning of Kuhn’s subjects as practical rather than 
theoretical. The subjects do reason about other (fictitious) people’s doings, and are thus the 
narrators and the others the characters, but Keefer sometimes writes as if the subjects are 
justifying their own actions, pursuing their own values and trying to bring their own projects 
to fruition. Keefer’s reliance on Taylor’s and MacIntyre’s conception of narrative reinforces 
this problem. Taylor and MacIntyre can be characterized as narrative realists; meaning that 
they not only view narratives as products, stories that can be told, but also insist that 
narratives can be lived. In fact, MacIntyre insists that narratives are lived before they are told 
(1996, 212). This is a topic of much debate and disagreement. Narrative realism is the view 
that narrative structures are in the material; that is, people’s experiences, lives, history itself 
etc. exhibit narrative features such as beginnings, middles and ends in coherent wholes. 
Narrative antirealism, with Ricoeur as one of its main advocates, holds that the narrative form 
is imposed on the material by the narrator, in the configurational act. This implied narrative 
realism can cause problems for Keefer’s criticism of Kuhn in a couple of ways. First, there is 
the general view found in MacIntyre that the story (of life, society, history) somehow is 
already written: “… I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the 
prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’” (216). This seems to imply 
that all individuals can do is simply to make out the text, as it were, and conform to pre-given 
roles – a view that runs counter to Keefer’s own emphasis on practical arguments as 
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concerning people’s choices on how to act. Second, there is the question of Kuhn’s distinction 
between reason with and reason about. It seems that when you live a narrative you reason with 
it. When you stop to retrace connections with the benefit of hindsight and tell the story 
forwards again, you have momentarily stepped out of it and turn it into a product capable of 
being reasoned about. But this is not clear, since Keefer does not distinguish between 
narrative realism and antirealism. Third, and even more interesting, is Keefer’s use of 
Taylor’s transition arguments in his explication of the nature of practical arguments. Taylor 
has, among other things, the following to say about transition arguments:  
 
It aims to establish, not that some position is correct absolutely, but rather that some 
position is superior to some other. … We show one of these comparative claims to be 
well founded when we can show that the move from A to B constitutes a gain 
epistemically. … The argument fixes on the nature of the transition from A to B. The 
nerve of the rational proof consists in showing that this transition is an error-reducing 
one (2000, 72).     
 
 Some observations are in order. To begin with it should be noted that transition 
arguments are different from what Kuhn is probing in her subjects. She asks for evidence for a 
view, not for comparisons or moves from view A to view B. Hence, it is difficult to recognize 
or trace any transition arguments in the responses she gets. Furthermore, the confusion of 
character and narrator may arise again. Charles Taylor subscribes to a form of narrative 
realism: “This form of argument has its source in biographical narrative. We are convinced 
that a certain view is superior because we have lived a transition which we understand as 
error-reducing and hence as epistemic gain” (72, my emphasis). It is not clear whether this 
translates into a requirement of personal experience, and it is not clear how Keefer uses it but 
he sometimes can be read as indicating that the subjects are talking about themselves – that is, 
they are both characters and narrators. This is of course fully possible if the roles are kept 
clearly apart. But Kuhn’s subjects do not in principle talk about themselves, even though 
some of them draw on their personal experience in exemplifying and supporting their 
arguments. Keefer does not explicitly tie this view to his rendering of practical arguments as 
concerning what people should do; however Taylor’s practical transition arguments basically 
seem to have an epistemic interest. Finally, can a transition argument be rendered as a 
narrative? To be sure, a transition is well suited to be captured by a narrative. In fact, many 
narratives tell a story of how things came to be. But narratives, at least narratives understood 
as products, neither incorporate nor entail any comparisons between the end (presumably B) 
and the beginning or origins (presumably A). A narrative would relate the events that led up 
to B. Also, it is worth noting that any comparison of A and B seems to presuppose that A and 
B are capable of being held as objects, such that their relative epistemic merit can be judged.  
 One last issue remains to be mentioned; Keefer’s suggestion that a practical argument 
or a narrative provides a context in which actions, intentions etc. can be rendered as rationally 
willed or intelligibly chosen. This, I believe, is true. A narrative can indeed provide a context 
of this sort, although it ought to carry no implications that all actions or intentions in fact are 
rational or even intelligible or based on values we find acceptable. Again, this may point to 
character/narrator differences and the problem arises of whether the narrator must be 
committed to the truth of the character’s beliefs, the rationality of his actions, the acceptability 
of his values. Personally I think not.  
 Are we in a position now to say whether narratives can be (informal) arguments? 
Whether narratives can do the job that Keefer wants them to do? I am not sure. Keefer 
conceives of theoretical and practical reasoning as highly different types of reasoning, and he 
seems to lump informal, practical, rhetorical arguments and narratives together. Whatever we 
 7 
T. Kvernbekk’s “Narratives as Informal Arguments” 
think of this categorization – narratives surely traverse the boundaries and cannot be restricted 
to one type only. Keefer thus cannot use narratives as alternatives to informal theoretical 
reasoning, if that is what he wants. On the other hand, he can use narratives to relate 
transitions, but hardly to judge whether the end represents an epistemic gain. It is not obvious 
to me that Kuhn’s subjects do reason in transitions, and it is by no means obvious that they 
have themselves been involved in what they reason about, as Taylor’s narrative realism 
requires. 
 The task of judging whether narratives (here conceived as products, as told or written) 
can be (informal) arguments is further complicated by the fact that both conceptions are large 
and rather vague. Neither Kuhn nor Keefer make it very clear what they take an informal 
argument to be. However, I shall presuppose that even informal arguments will, in some form 
to some measure, contain conclusions, premises, inferences. Narratives also contain 
conclusions, and one might reasonably construe beginning and middle as premises since they 
lead up to the conclusion. However, it hardly seems likely that the premise-conclusion 
relation found in narratives is similar to that found in informal arguments, although this of 
course depends on what one takes an informal argument to be. There is at least one major 
reason for my skepticism. In a narrative, the conclusion is known for a fact. It exists as 
something that happened before we can tell a story about it. Now, if we follow Biro and 
Siegel (1992), premises provide reasons to accept a conclusion. They base their 
argumentation theory on the claim that “… it is a conceptual truth about arguments that their 
central … purpose is to provide a bridge from truths or justified beliefs to as yet unknown … 
truths or as yet unjustified beliefs” (92). But a narrative conclusion is not an as yet unknown 
truth, it is quite the contrary known for a fact. The relation of premises and conclusion in 
arguments is, as Kuhn points out, one of justification; it is a matter of warranting our belief in 
the conclusion. In narratives there is no need to warrant our belief in the conclusion, since we 
already know it for a fact. The problem of when reasons (evidence, premises) are good 
enough to warrant belief in the conclusion does therefore not arise in narratives as it does in 
arguments. If the point of arguments is to show that knowing the premises warrants knowing 
the conclusion, and if this justificatory relationship of premises to conclusion is at the heart of 
the very definition of an argument, then I conclude that narratives are not arguments, formal 
or informal.         
   
 
The Importance of Form 
 
Most narrativists pay much attention to form, which is depicted as that which 
distinguishes narratives from other forms of representation and therefore is of great 
significance. For example, Louis Mink, a prominent narrative antirealist, is at pains to show 
that narratives are neither scientific theories nor chronicles (Mink 1978). A narrative is a 
meaningful, coherent whole portraying a configured sequence of events, actions, intentions 
etc. that leads to a closure of a plot. In and of itself this would seem to preclude not only 
theories and chronicles, but also e.g. syllogistic arguments and scripts. A script is a kind of 
generalized “recipe” for action that people may use to navigate adequately in various social 
contexts, and is described by Deanna Kuhn as being “narrative” in style. But scripts hardly 
contain plots, nor do they make up coherent wholes with non-random beginnings and ends.    
 One of the most important issues regarding narrative form concerns the relation of 
premises to conclusion; provided of course that we grant that we can speak of premises and 
conclusions in narratives. This issue is of importance here because Kuhn insists that evidence 
(premises) must be separated from theory and independently appraised, whereas Keefer 
insists that the narrative is itself evidence for the claim or belief in question, such that 
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evidence and claim/conclusion cannot (always) be separated. In discussing this problem, 
Ricoeur invokes W. B. Gallie’s notion of “followability.” To follow a story is to “… 
understand the successive actions, thoughts and feelings in the story inasmuch as they present 
a particular ‘directedness’” (1984,150). The orientation in a certain direction that we find 
here, Ricoeur says, amounts to recognition of a teleological function in the conclusion or end. 
But when a narrative is configured and then told forwards again, the storyline must be 
followed up to the conclusion – in no way can it be deduced or predicted from the premises 
but must be traced through the entire sequence. It is unclear whether Ricoeur himself endorses 
this view, but Louis Mink (1978) certainly does and has taken it a step further. Mink strongly 
supports Keefer’s view concerning narratives as sufficient evidence for conclusions. There 
can be no “detachable” conclusion in the historian’s work, he claims, because the narrative as 
a whole supports the conclusion. The end is an integral part of the narrative order. Were this 
not so, we would not have a narrative but a chronicle. The relation between premises and 
conclusion is internal; in the sense that the two cannot be viewed or evaluated separately or 
independently. Mink’s view of this internal relationship stems from his strong emphasis on 
narrative form and the importance of distinguishing narratives from chronicles. He suggests 
that appraisals of narratives in terms of truth or falsity require that their form is seen as 
representing something that can be true or false. If we e.g. conceive of the whole as a 
conjunction that is true if and only if each individual assertion is true, we apply the model of a 
chronicle, not of a narrative. The cognitive function of narrative form, Mink says, is “… not 
just to relate a succession of events, but depict an ensemble of different kinds of 
interrelationships as a single whole” (1978, 144). For this reason, we are invited to believe in 
the narrative as a whole, not in some part of it. In fact, we are especially invited to believe in 
the sequence of actions, events and intentions leading up to the end rather than in the 
conclusion, which we already (can) know. It emerges from this that if narratives can be 
practical, informal arguments, then Keefer seems to be correct in suggesting that the evidence 
in support of practical beliefs is not logically independent from those beliefs. If Mink is right, 
in narratives they cannot be separated at all. 
 But it is unclear where this preliminary conclusion takes us as far as the possible role 
of narratives as internal evidence for the conclusion is concerned. According to Deanna Kuhn, 
genuine evidence is clearly differentiated from a belief and bears on its truth or correctness. 
For her, this justificatory relation between premises and conclusion is at the heart of any form 
of argument, informal, real-world reasoning included. Keefer, as we have seen, doubts that 
this is the case for practical, informal reasoning. Keefer’s position on justification and 
evidence is complex. On the one hand he sees practical reasoning as concerning what people 
should do, on the other hand he employs Taylor’s notion of a transition argument, which 
implies comparison of views and evaluation of epistemic gain. He indicates that justification 
(in practical reasoning) may be at issue only in cases of substantial disagreement, and he 
claims that “In practical argument the starting point is reputable opinion and the goal, justified 
belief; whereas, in theoretical reasoning, a claim is judged by appeal to the evidence that 
supports it” (1996, 37-38). Evidently, justified belief is a goal in theoretical reasoning too, but 
the point here is that the very notion of justified belief seems to imply some sort of evidence 
or support, although perhaps of a different sort. Hence, again perhaps, his insistence that 
Kuhn is misguided in demanding that evidence must be clearly differentiated from the belief. 
So far we can conclude that evidence is certainly not logically independent of the belief if the 
two are undetachable. 
 It is still, however, not clear where this all leaves us concerning the twin ideas of 
undetachability and of narratives as a whole providing evidence for the conclusion. Can the 
relation of premises to conclusion – beginning and middle to end – be construed as 
justificatory and thus parallel to “ordinary” arguments? I am not sure. If it cannot, then 
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Keefer’s claim that narratives provide evidence for the claim in question must be rejected. Let 
me briefly introduce a distinction between explanation-seeking and evidence-seeking 
questions. These may occasionally overlap, but for the most part should not be conflated. 
Offering an explanation for a fact is different from providing reasons for believing something 
is the case. I would like to suggest that in narratives, the relation of premises and conclusion is 
better construed as explanatory. Narratives generally are explanations of how something (the 
end) came about (e.g. Mattingly 1991, Ricoeur 1984). The explanation consists of a causal 
chain of events and actions leading up to, culminating in or producing, the conclusion. 
According to Keefer, this same causal chain also constitutes evidence for the conclusion. But 
in narratives, the conclusion is already known for a fact; hence, we hardly need to further 
warrant our belief. And should we want this kind of warrant, it is by no means obvious that 
we get it by adding an explanatory story. As already suggested above, we are invited to 
believe in the whole causal chain rather than in the conclusion. And if we should demand 
evidence that this particular chain of events is true, we are faced with the same problem again 
– only moved one level up, as it were. Should this new evidence be independent or should it 
not? 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
 A conclusion is an ending. To understand a story, Ricoeur (1984) says, is to 
understand why and how the successive episodes led to the conclusion; the closure of the plot. 
Were this paper a narrative, the preceding thoughts would have to constitute a string of 
”events” from a non-random beginning to a non-random end.  
 Narrative theory and argumentation theory are both huge domains and to bring them 
together is a task that requires caution and tentative conclusions. My starting point was 
Matthew Keefer’s critique of Deanna Kuhn’s investigation into and theory of informal 
argumentation. Keefer asserts that people’s informal reasoning is only partly captured by 
Kuhn’s approach, which is based on a theoretical, scientific model. He thinks that Kuhn’s 
subject exhibit practical reasoning, and uses narratives to exemplify this. My main aim in this 
paper has been to investigate into whether narratives can do the job that Keefer assigns to 
them. That I am not sure of and it is hard to judge since Keefer does not offer an explication 
of what narratives are and why he thinks they can be viewed as practical arguments. Things 
are further complicated by his very broad conception of practical reasoning, and by the fact 
that it is not obvious that Kuhn’s subjects exhibit such reasoning. 
 I have voiced some doubt concerning whether I believe narratives can be arguments or 
not. I surely do not think they can be formal arguments, the form of both formal arguments 
(e.g. syllogisms) and narratives precludes such an identification. I am less sure about informal 
narratives, by and large because this notion is so unclear. But while I am skeptical about 
narratives as arguments, I do think they can be used to portray various reasoning processes 
(provided, of course, that arguments and reasoning are not one and the same thing, albeit 
obviously closely related). However, I also believe that narratives transcend Keefer’s 
opposition between theoretical and practical reasoning. They can be both. I think he can put 
narratives to some of the uses he suggests, for example to narrate transitions from A to B. But 
I do not think he can use them to compare A and B and not to judge any possible epistemic 
gain involved in the transition. I also doubt whether narratives can be said to provide evidence 
for their own conclusions. This is not necessarily because I agree with Kuhn that premises and 
conclusions must be capable of independent appraisal, but because I think the relationship of 
premises and conclusions in narratives is better construed as explanatory than as justificatory. 
One does not necessarily justify a belief or conclusion by explaining how it came to be.   
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